The mind-brain problem (I): onto-epistemological foundations
*Correspondencia: Dr. Javier Tirapu Ustárroz. Fundación Argibide. Iturrama, 7. E-31007 Pamplona (Navarra).
E-mail: javitirapu@ono.com
Introduction. Throughout the history of thought, science and philosophy have addressed the problem of mind-brain from different epistemic perspectives. The first covers specific areas of reality and constructs hypotheses with limited scope and multiple inter-scientific connectivity with the aim of validating theoretical models; the second extends its systemic architecture to all that is real (including scientific activity).
Development. The complexity of the mind-brain problem requires the generation of a link connecting the disciplines of philosophy and science; our onto-epistemological presuppositions therefore fall within the framework of a scientificallyoriented philosophy (scientific philosophy). Emergentist materialism is defended as a coherent and verifiable philosophicalscientific solution, as opposed to other proposals developed on the basis of different ontological models (for example, interactionist dualism, functionalism, theory of identity, epiphenomenalism, and so on).
Conclusions. An answer to the mind-brain problem is only feasible if based on a philosophically grounded cognitive neuroscience: emergentist materialism –an ontological postulate– holds that the mind is an emergent property (qualitative novelty) of the brain; scientific realism –an epistemological postulate– holds that cognitive neuroscience is the basic theoretical-experimental tool that allows cognitive access to both the brain and its neurocognitive processes. We consider that on the basis of this philosophical reasoning, cognitive neuroscience acquires epistemic legitimacy to be able to
undertake the study of the most genuinely human mental process: consciousness.
Desarrollo La complejidad del problema mente-cerebro exige generar un vínculo de conexión disciplinar entre la filosofía y la ciencia; nuestros presupuestos ontoepistemológicos se erigen, por lo tanto, en el marco de una filosofía orientada científicamente (filosofía científica). Se defiende el materialismo emergentista como solución filosófico-científica coherente y contrastable en contraposición a otras propuestas desarrolladas desde diferentes modelos ontológicos (por ejemplo, dualismo interaccionista, funcionalismo, teoría de la identidad, epifenomenalismo...).
Conclusiones La respuesta al problema mente-cerebro sólo es factible desde una neurociencia cognitiva fundamentada filosóficamente: el materialismo emergentista –postulado ontológico– afirma que la mente es una propiedad emergente (novedad cualitativa) del cerebro; el realismo científico –postulado epistemológico– sostiene que la neurociencia cognitiva es la herramienta teórico-experimental básica que posibilita el acceso cognoscitivo tanto al cerebro como a sus procesos neurocognitivos. Consideramos que a partir de esta fundamentación filosófica, la neurociencia cognitiva adquiere legitimidad epistémica para acometer el estudio del proceso mental más genuinamente humano: la conciencia.
