Introduction. Consciousness is the result of a series of neurobiological processes in the brain and is, in turn, a feature of the level of its complexity. In fact, being conscious and being aware place us before what Chalmers called the ‘soft problem’ and the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. The first refers to aspects such as wakefulness, attention or knowledge, while the second is concerned with such complex concepts as self-awareness, ‘neural self’ or social cognition. In this sense it can be said that the concept of consciousness as a unitary thing poses problems of approaching a highly complex reality.
Development. We outline the main models that have addressed the topic of consciousness from a neuroscientific perspective. On the one hand, there are the conscious experience models of Crick, Edelman and Tononi, and Llinàs, and, on the other, the models and neuronal bases of self-consciousness by authors such as Damasio (core and extended consciousness), Tulving (autonoetic and noetic consciousness and chronesthesia), the problem of qualia (Dennett, Popper, Ramachandran) and the cognit model (Fuster).
Conclusions. All the stimuli we receive from the outside world and from our own internal world are converted and processed by the brain so as to integrate them, and from there they become part of our identity. The perception of a dog and being able to recognise it as such or the understanding of our own consciousness are the result of the functioning of brain, neuronal and synaptic structures. The more complex processes of consciousness, such as self-awareness or empathy, are probably emergent brain processes.